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In spite of its connotations in everyday use, the term independence as republicans understand 
it is not a celebration of individualism or self-reliance. Instead it embodies an 
acknowledgement of the importance of personal and social relationships in people’s lives and 
reflects our connectedness rather than separateness. Independence is in this regard a relational 
ideal. This aspect of the concept of republican freedom as independence has not been widely 
discussed. Properly understood, however, I shall argue that it is a useful concept in 
addressing a fundamental problem in social philosophy that has preoccupied theorists of 
relational autonomy, namely how to reconcile the idea of individual human agency with the 
inevitable and necessary influence of other people, both directly and indirectly as part of our 
social environment. I derive my account primarily from Mary Wollstonecraft’s work which I 
believe to have been highly innovative in its appreciation of the effects of social influences 
on human agency whilst remaining largely overlooked by current republican theorists as a 
historical source.1 
My purpose in this chapter is to set out the internal logic of republican independence 
showing how the individual agent is reconciled to the collective decisions and intentions of 
the population through the central concept of arbitrariness. I frame my discussion in the 
context of the particular problem of reconciling social influence and individual agency in 
oppressive environments, raising the difficult question of how to recognize the profound and 
pervasive effect that domineering and marginalizing cultural conditions have on subjected 
people’s lives, and on the choices they make, without thereby undermining or diminishing 
their status as self-governing agents. This is an especially difficult problem for many 
republicans because freedom is only considered to be undermined or reduced by intentional 
threats – those threats that can be attributed to the actions and decisions of individual agents, 
even if indirectly. Impediments that originate in the effects of collective cultural attitudes and 
social structures are said not to be traceable to individual intentions and are not thereby 
damaging to freedom. I outline a response that I derive from Wollstonecraft’s conception of 
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independence showing how republicans can use this ideal to address social and structural 
forms of domination.  
 The issue of social domination or oppression has also been one of the motivating 
problems that have driven the development of the ideal of relational autonomy. This is a 
subfield within the overall field of autonomy that wrestles with the dilemma outlined above 
of remaining committed to the importance and possibility of individual agency while 
acknowledging and seeking to understand the significant impact that social structures and 
cultural context have on individual autonomous action.2 While relational autonomy theorists 
have at times noted that the republican concept contains some useful insights for their own 
approach, the two literatures – which have both emerged over more or less the same period 
over the past two or three decades – have not often been brought together in a sustained 
manner.3 There are several understandable reasons why this might have been so. First, 
republican writers themselves have often neglected the problem of social oppression. 
Secondly, the basic concepts of autonomy and freedom, while related and often used to refer 
to overlapping ideas, are not identical and so the insights of one field do not necessarily 
translate to the other. A third reason may be that while feminist philosophers have largely 
driven the development of relational theories of autonomy there has long been a suspicion by 
many feminists of republicanism given its patriarchal history that has been seen to stifle 
rather than liberate women as agents (Pateman 2007, Phillips 2000). This stance has 
diminished somewhat in recent years thanks both to the work of important contemporary 
women writing as republicans as well as to studies that position Mary Wollstonecraft as a 
significant political theorist who reconceptualized many parts of the republican framework to 
accommodate and address feminist concerns.4  
Drawing on some of these latter republican studies, Catriona Mackenzie has analyzed 
Wollstonecraft as prefiguring and anticipating the contemporary debate about relational 
autonomy (2016). I find Mackenzie’s arguments both perceptive and persuasive and am in 
substantial agreement with her position. She makes clear in her discussion that her concern is 
with how Wollstonecraft foreshadows current work on relational autonomy rather than on 
Wollstonecraft’s specifically republican structures and tools (68). With this in mind, my final 
purpose in this chapter will be to highlight three particular contrasts in how relational 
autonomy and independence theories frame their respective approaches to the basic problem 
of social domination and individual agency.  
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Although I am articulating a relational formulation for independence as freedom from 
arbitrary rule as a relational ideal in its own right, the inevitable backdrop is the extensive 
literature on relational autonomy. The terms independence, freedom, and autonomy are 
related but distinct. While they are often conflated (and, as ever in philosophy, there are no 
fixed definitions of any of these notions) the words are often located within specific 
literatures and discussions, each having its own concerns and reference points, and drawing 
upon distinct frameworks and assumptions. There are understandable reasons for this. 
Autonomy is often understood with reference to Kantian and post-Kantian developments in 
philosophy while the classical period of republican writings extends from Rome and comes to 
an end at the end of the late eighteenth century.5 In its contemporary form, focusing on non-
domination, republican discourse is heavily focused on freedom as a political ideal rather 
than as a condition of moral agency or as part of a metaphysical account of the self.6 Much of 
the literature on relational autonomy addresses these wider concerns. Mackenzie, for 
example, grounds her approach in a “social ontology of persons—that is, a conception of 
persons that emphasizes the role of embodied social practices (including linguistic and 
cultural practices), social group identities, and historical contingencies in the formation of our 
individual practical identities” (2014, 21) while Jennifer Nedelsky rejects “approaches that 
treat relations as peripheral rather than central and constitutive” of the human self (2008, 7). 
These are reasonable approaches to important questions, and I find Mackenzie’s approach 
especially illuminating. Nevertheless, I restrict my focus to the political dimension for the 
sake of clarity. To this extent, as I outline it, independence will be consistent with a range of 
substantive moral and metaphysical accounts of autonomy, even if its historical progenitors 
would have taken clear positions on these (Coffee 2016, 2017).  
Rather than with definitions, my concern is with the issues that relational theories of 
freedom and autonomy address. Here autonomy and independence share the same basic sense 
of self-government or self-legislation, having a common etymology albeit from different 
roots. The traditional synonym for independence was of a person able to act sui iuris, where 
the Latin mirrors the Greek for self (sui, auto) and law (iuris, nomos).7 I take the idea of self-
government as my starting point. Self-government is itself a complex ideal. It connotes an 
ideal of having the ability to shape the contours of one’s own life, taking control from within 
oneself rather than being directed from outside influences. This contains several separate but 
internally related aspects. Mackenzie distinguishes three elements of autonomy: self-
determination (“the freedom and opportunities necessary for determining the direction of 
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one’s own life”), self-government (“the competences necessary for making authentic 
decisions about one’s life”) and self-authorization (“to regard oneself, and to be regarded by 
others, as having the normative authority” to have the other two capacities) (2016, 80). She 
finds all of these elements in Wollstonecraft’s account of independence. I agree but articulate 
these differently along two dimensions, independence of mind and civil or political 
independence. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the first section, I address some 
misconceptions about independence. In the second, I identify three distinctive features of the 
internal logic of freedom as independence that give it a relational character: first, that the 
person is always located within a community (‘free person in the free state’); second that the 
individual and collective perspectives are connected through the mediating role played by the 
notion of arbitrariness; and third, that a causal relationship exists linking each person’s 
freedom as independence such that that the dependence of one class of people jeopardizes the 
independence of the whole community. In section III, I consider the issue of structural 
domination in which systematic oppressive forms of social and cultural organization combine 
to undermine independence especially by restricting and distorting the range of background 
values and concepts that are available in public discourse, and by creating conditions that 
often lead to marginalized people developing an internalized sense of inferiority and 
acceptance of their situation.  
I 
Independence is a confusing term. According to Nedelsky, independence is an individualistic 
concept that emphasizes the boundaries that separate people (1989, 2012). This 
individualism, she maintains, is characteristic of liberal thinking which she identifies as being 
constructed around a notion of what she describes as ‘autonomy as independence’ in contrast 
to relational autonomy (2012, 3-8). Such an individualistic way of thinking, Nedelsky argues, 
is both misleading, because these boundaries are artificial, and damaging, because drawing 
them obscures and undermines the ties between us that make any notion of the individual 
meaningful. The result is that we are presented with a false choice. “When autonomy is 
identified with individual independence and security from collective power”, she says, “the 
choice is posed between admitting collective control and preserving autonomy in any given 
realm of life” (1989, 14; 2012, 126-7). “Such a dichotomy”, she adds, “forecloses a whole 
range of social arrangements – at least to anyone who values autonomy”. These arrangements 
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are those that would foster and protect the social relationships that make personal freedom 
possible. Nedelsky regards the high value placed on independence as characteristic of what 
she calls ‘liberal individualism’, something she identifies as “the dominant mode of thought”, 
whose ideals inform and permeate the “set of (often unexamined) frameworks and 
presuppositions that are deep in Anglo-American culture”. These features influence the 
structure of our social, political and legal institutions as well as our background cultural way 
of thinking (2012, 8, 41). The effect of the value that is placed on ‘autonomy as 
independence’ is that people come to think of themselves as self-contained – often self-made 
and self-reliant – individuals without appreciating or understanding the role that relationships 
played in making this quality possible both as an ability and in the options it affords them. 
Dependence and mutual interdependence are inevitable features of daily life for us all, she 
argues (26-30). If we both fail to recognize this and even overtly denigrate these aspects of 
social reality then we can hardly construct the most effective or most just set of institutions 
and practices within which to live. 
Although I believe that Nedelsky overstates her case, I am sympathetic with much of 
what she says about the dangers of individualism, especially in how it can come to influence 
the social, conceptual and normative structures of society. I too distance myself from 
individualism of the sort that she describes. I do not, however, recognize in her description 
the concept of independence as I use it. Underpinning Nedelsky’s critique is a rejection of the 
idea that autonomy is incompatible with interference from others (2012, 97-9). Rightly, in my 
opinion, she maintains that interference of certain kinds is necessary for the development of 
the very capacity to act autonomously. Accordingly, she argues, we should focus on the 
structure of power relations between people, developing institutions and practices that 
promote constructive power relations (2012, 64). To put this in republican terms, Nedelsky’s 
hostility to the ideal of autonomy as independence is tied to her deeper rejection of the idea of 
freedom as non-interference, which is the view that freedom is curtailed only and always 
where there is interference in a person’s intended actions. Republicans, too, reject the non-
interference definition of freedom, arguing instead for a conception of freedom as non-
domination which is precisely an attempt to constrain and restructure power relations.8 (This 
is not to say that she endorses freedom as non-domination. Nedelsky does not discuss this 
concept in Law’s Relations and the structure of freedom as independence from arbitrary 
power is different from her notion of relational autonomy.)9  
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In developing the idea of independence as a relational form of freedom I am drawing on 
the historical republican tradition. Another source of confusion, therefore, is that there can be 
no doubt that this tradition’s most well-known representatives have understood independence 
in just these bounded individualistic and self-reliant terms. To name just one, Richard Price – 
a mentor to Wollstonecraft and her close friend – identifies as the paradigm of freemen, the 
“independent and hardy yeomanry” of the American provinces who were “trained to arms, 
instructed in their rights, cloathed in homespun… [and] drawing plenty from the ground” 
(Price 1992, 145). While was such rugged individualism highly prized, dependence was also 
despised. Dependence in republican discourse was synonymous with servitude in a context 
where slaves were reviled and shunned. Not only were slaves abject in their inability to stand 
up for themselves and to take their own decisions but this very condition was said to foster 
and generate ignoble patterns of behavior such as cowardice, sycophancy and deceit which 
were regarded as being incompatible with the virtues of the independent citizen-agent 
(Skinner 2008, Coffee 2014).  
In response, I should like to emphasize that these sentiments – the valorizing of the 
self-made, self-reliant individual and the denigration of those who are regarded as dependent 
– have no part in the formal meaning of the term independence as I define it (and as I derive 
it from Wollstonecraft) and neither do they have any place in its internal logic (Coffee 2013, 
2014). Indeed, it is as a corrective to these unhelpful historical attitudes, which have become 
deeply ingrained in republican theorizing, that I have turned to the writings of women and 
other marginalized writers such as ex-slaves and Reconstruction-era black writing as my 
primary source of inspiration (Coffee 2017, 2018 forthcoming). Women in the eighteenth 
century knew what it was like to be always and inescapably dependent on others. However, 
while writers such as Wollstonecraft sought to escape the clutches of dependence they did not 
despise or reject the fact of needing care or assistance. The predominant thought was not to 
achieve an isolated existence but to stand among equals, protected from the abuses of power.  
In light of these misconceptions, an inevitable question is why we should continue to 
use the term rather than discard it in favor of a more apt label such as ‘interdependence’. One 
reason for retaining it echoes Nedelsky’s own justification for persevering with the concept 
of autonomy despite its confusing connotations (2012, 41-5). Independence, like autonomy, 
is a foundational and indispensable moral, political and social value that is of great 
importance to both individuals and communities. It is too important an ideal to surrender or 
lose sight of and the very misconceptions it generates are what make it all the more necessary 
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to reconceive. A second reason is that independence is a historically significant term for 
personal and civic freedom. Although republicans often refer today to ‘non-domination’, 
following Pettit, this use represents only a small part of the considerable literature that 
stretches back to the Roman Republic. There is a danger in breaking the connection with this 
historic idea that we lose the insights, possibilities and subtleties of this complex ideal. 
Finally, independence is also Wollstonecraft’s own word. For scholars of her work, to replace 
it with a proxy such as ‘interdependence’ would distort her meaning.  
Wollstonecraft was acutely aware of her state of dependence and self-consciously 
described her condition, and the condition of all women, as slaves because of their 
inescapable subjection to male power (Coffee 2013). As a wife she had no legal standing on 
her own but was instead covered by her husband who represented them both, something she 
described vividly in her novel Maria.10 Even in a happy marriage to a man who would never 
treat her as less than an equal the brutal fact remained that a wife was wholly in his power 
and could never act on her own account. In their own marriage Wollstonecraft and Godwin 
may perhaps have been mutually interdependent (we might suppose) but this does not negate 
the importance of independence so much as express an additional value to be considered. 
Wollstonecraft gives two grounds for this. First, she highlights the psychological importance 
of knowing that she is an equal, an agent in her own right who is a personality separate from 
others who can make her own decisions and judgements. This does nothing to deny the fact 
that our lives are intimately and intricately bound up with one another. Rather she argues that 
true interdependence comes only from a position in which each party starts as an equal – 
morally and legally – with the mutual respect that this requires.11   
The second part of her argument draws on the old republican saw that we simply cannot 
rely on the continuing goodwill of those who have unconstrained power over us. Republicans 
have, for example, always been suspicious of the claim that they had nothing to fear from the 
king because he would never abuse his power since this said nothing of how his successor 
might behave. Bonded slaves, too, knew that even though their master might have promised 
them their liberty when he died, all too often the executor would disregard this when the 
estate was divided.12 So it was with women who entered seemingly loving marriages only for 
things to change.13 Wollstonecraft would not, I believe, accept the alternative rendering 
‘interdependence’ to replace ‘independence’ where this would obscure or soften the vital 
protections that independence provides. In emphasizing our connectedness we must not lose 
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sight of the real dangers of dependence on arbitrary forces without protection and the ease 
with which the powerful can take advantage of their dominance while professing mutuality.  
Independence in Wollstonecraft’s sense does not indicate that one does not need the 
help of others. Rather what is required is that the resources that a person needs in order to 
function as an equal in society are available as a matter of right rather than as acts of charity 
or grace. An elderly person, for example, who is now unable to work remains independent by 
being entitled to an old age pension, just as a severely disabled person has a right to the 
appropriate forms of care. It is consistent with independence that a mother of young children 
either receives support for childcare (if she chooses paid work for example) or has access to 
an income that allows her to care for her own children (Coffee 2014). Individuals requiring 
assistance of these kinds should not feel guilty or beholden. Instead, they have an expectation 
that its provision is an entitlement for anyone considered to be an equal collaborator and 
member of society. This is not a matter of demanding one’s rights but of understanding one’s 
equality. Of course the love and intimacy that so often are part of the caring relationships that 
are so important in all our lives cannot be compelled by law. But we can seek to secure for 
each person the means for protection against abuse (Young 1995). 
II 
Independence, like autonomy, is an ideal of self-government. This is both an individual and a 
collective concept, although it is grounded in the concern that individuals should govern their 
behavior according to their own wills rather than being controlled externally by the wills of 
others. Two aspects of this definition are important to note. First, control is understood in 
terms of relationships of power rather than of actual coercion. Secondly, control must be 
resilient. We are not self-governing if it is by mere chance that we are not the objects of 
unwarranted interference. Rather we must be beyond its reach. In republican terms, this 
means that we must be independent of the discretionary (or arbitrary) power that others might 
wield over us.14 This is a matter of our status within a collective body of people rather than of 
our particular abilities or powers as individuals.  
One can discern something of the character of an approach to political theory through 
its imagery. Within the social contract tradition, for example, the starting point is that of the 
pre-political individual who consents to be part of a collective body because of the net 
advantage. Although there is some loss of freedoms in joining the state, overall freedom is 
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said to increase. This contrasts with the republican approach within which independence is 
situated. Rather than building up from the individual towards the political community in its 
conception of freedom, the republican model starts with the fact of community. The image is 
that of ‘the free man in the free state’ (Skinner 2010). Freedom is not compromised or netted 
off against unfreedom within the state but instead, in Pettit’s word, instantiated by it (1997, 
106-7). Personal freedom is made possible only in relationship with others and we work from 
both ends – up from the individual and down from the collective – to derive the meaning of 
this ideal as well as its parameters and scope. To understand and locate these we have to 
understand the central role played by the concept of the common good around which the 
whole of republican independence, and by extension the whole republican framework, is 
constructed.  
Independence is only possible in community with others for the simple reason that 
outside of society the resilience condition could not be met. People would each be exposed to 
the potential of unrestrained power from anyone that happened to cross their path. Even lone 
individuals or hermits are not truly independent in this sense since they cannot escape the 
danger that groups of bandits might discover their whereabouts and overpower them. 
Independence on this scale requires a strong force to back it up, which requires the 
cooperation of others. Freedom is, therefore, a necessarily social ideal. Republicans take the 
force that enables freedom to be the law. This law inevitably faces a delicate task. If it is to 
guarantee rather than threaten my independence it must reflect my ideas about what I wish to 
do. If it does this for me, it must do so for all those others over whom it governs, on pain of 
being arbitrary for them. The law, therefore, must represent and uphold the people’s shared 
interests, or in other words, their common good. Identifying and agreeing what is in the 
common good is the primary theoretical and practical concern for republicans. This is the 
criterion by which the notion of arbitrariness is understood, where arbitrariness is part of the 
meaning of freedom. The common good is the reference point by which a people distinguish 
freedom from oppression, or historically, servitude. Anyone whose ideas are not included in 
the shared ideal of the common good, and who is therefore ruled by a law that does not 
represent their interests and perspectives, is ruled arbitrarily and thereby unfree.  
Having the common good as its focal point, independence is both a socially-
determined and a necessarily inclusive ideal. By its definition, the idea of the common good 
of the members – or citizens – used by a political community must reflect the actual ideas and 
perspectives of all those it claims to represent. While there is scope for republicans to differ 
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on the balance between the extent to which the common good is objectively determined by 
reason or the moral law, or varies with the subjective opinions of the people, republicans are 
agreed that an ideal of the common good cannot be imposed but must be endorsed by the 
citizens themselves. It follows that the people must deliberate in an open and accessible 
manner and discuss their shared objectives, interests and values. This requires both a suitable 
institutional framework and a population of individuals who are capable of and willing to 
engage with the process. The role that others play in making our independence possible 
points to another of its relational features.  
As I understand Wollstonecraft, freedom is constituted by three component parts each 
of which is causally dependent on each of the others: independence, equality and virtue.15 To 
be independent we must be equals within a society in which that equality is respected and 
protected, which is what is meant by virtue.16 If any one of these elements is diminished, it 
has a corresponding effect in weakening the others. Dependence, for example, introduces 
inequalities between the powerful and the weak, while inequalities by placing people 
asymmetrically with respect to the common good weakens people’s resolve to behave with 
virtue. Relationships of both dependence and inequality are said, in the traditional 
terminology, to corrupt virtue. They do this for both parties to the relationship, for both 
dominator and dominated alike. The powerful are motivated not to maintain the collective 
good but to protect their advantage, while the powerless are not in a position to think in a 
high-minded way but must seek any benefit that they can by whatever means. Each side, 
therefore, views the other not as a fellow citizen but as a threat and a rival. Significantly, the 
process of corruption is said to spread from one bilateral case of domination to others as more 
and more people are drawn into the conflict. Once individuals have lost their commitment to 
the common good then this affects their behavior in other relationships, particularly where 
they seek to gain support for their cause from others (a man dominating his wife for example 
may try to persuade others that this is an acceptable, even good, thing so that he does not 
stand out).  
No less than virtue, the condition of equality is a demanding one. It is not enough that 
people are equal in some respects but not others because the process of corruption spreads 
from one sphere of social life to the others. Continuing with the domestic situation, for 
example, where a wife is dependent on her husband financially then this undermines her 
independence in other areas of life because she cannot risk displeasing him and losing his 
goodwill. Legal and political equality mean little if one cannot pay one’s bills. Similarly, 
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people’s economic independence is compromised if they lack the basic legal or political 
rights to protect their interests. As pockets of inequality and dependence spring up throughout 
society, so the process of corruption spreads both horizontally, from one bilateral relationship 
of domination to another, and vertically, to infect the institutions that are responsible for 
maintaining independence in the state. The process is both relentless and imperceptible, 
spreading like rust, to use Madame Roland’s image, eventually to corrupt the virtue of society 
as a whole as the moral community is replaced by an arena of competing private interests.17 
And like rust, the process once started is difficult to arrest or reverse. Each person’s freedom, 
then, is tied to that of everybody else.18  
We can now see how integral relationships of care are not only to the independence of 
the individuals who receive support but also to the freedom of the entire community. A 
person in need of care cannot be dependent in the republican sense because this would 
introduce a corrupting factor into society that would eventually come to threaten the freedom 
of us all. This possibly sounds far-fetched. But the numbers involved are considerable. We 
can think, for example, about how a society treats its elderly population. In the UK there are 
around 12 million people of state pensionable age which represents some 30% of the 
workforce (in the USA this percent is 20%).19 As people in this age group come to need 
increasing amounts of care, if they lack adequate resources this can have several effects. 
Where the costs of caring for one’s parents rise, for example, then children are forced to 
make difficult decisions. They may perhaps be forced to turn to shoddy care homes and they 
may come to resent the burden and the feelings of guilt that emerge. Trust between 
generations may then erode, and younger people realizing that they will have to save for 
themselves become hardened to the plight of others. Low paid care workers can become 
cynical and alienated and even take out these feelings on those in their care. Once 
dependence and inequality are introduced then the effects on virtue can quickly start to 
unravel across different sectors and sections of the population. If the example of the elderly 
seems a stretch from historic republicanism, the structure of this argument mirrors the 
classical arguments for why republics should not allow either slavery or monarchy to take 
root in their societies.20 
The right to receive appropriate kinds of care and support does not, of course, remove 
the need for fostering intimate, loving family relations. These are part of the social norms that 
support independence rather than independence being an ideal that opposes them. If families 
and other carers need greater support from the state to ensure that the necessary level of 
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loving and personalized care can be maintained, then this too is a duty of the state to 
uphold.21 In short, the independence of the carer and the cared for must be prioritized.  
III 
A problem that many feminists will have immediately spotted with the model of 
independence outlined above was its reliance on an ideal of the common good as 
representative and inclusively defined. Identifying any such ideal would be a problematic 
undertaking at the best of times but given the long history of marginalization and oppression 
of women then the prospects seem vanishingly slender. Not only has there been a long history 
of sexism in republican theory but much of its core terminology – citizen, civic duty, public 
and private, as well as independence itself – can be seen to have taken on gendered and 
exclusionary nuances and meanings.22 This presents a genuinely challenging obstacle and is 
effectively an application of a longstanding issue of circularity in republican theory: citizens 
are only free in a free state, while a state is only free where its citizens are free. In other 
words, it takes an independence-supporting community to produce independent citizens and 
yet such a community can only be created by people who are already independent. 
  A related problem concerns what republicans are to say about women’s agency where 
they live in flawed and non-ideal societies. This issue has sometimes been expressed as the 
‘agency dilemma’ (Khader 2011, Mackenzie 2015, 48). If we accept that social 
circumstances shape and direct our identities, preferences and capacities, then under 
oppressive conditions we are confronted with a difficult choice. People in difficult 
circumstances often make what seem to be bad choices, or at least choices that would not 
seem to be in their best interests – for example by reducing rather than increasing their 
overall life options or acting on social stereotypes such as the dutiful housewife whose 
fulfilment is only through serving her family – rather than authentically choosing for 
themselves how they want to direct their life.23 We then face a troubling choice: do we accept 
that the choices made by members of the victimized group are autonomous (or independent) 
or do we “risk impugning [their] agency and opening the door to objectionably paternalistic 
and coercive forms of intervention in their lives” (Mackenzie 2015, 48)? We also risk 
constraining the diversity in potentially valuable or legitimate choice and ways of life by 
judging too harshly those we consider unenlightened or inauthentic. 
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  I take these problems – the identification of the common good, and how we think of 
the agency of the oppressed – in turn.24 Starting with the first, one of Wollstonecraft’s great 
contributions to republican theory comes in the way that she addresses the use of structural 
domination. She analyses independence as coming in two parts, both of which are necessary. 
In order to be free, we must be able to think for ourselves (independence of mind) and be able 
to act on the outcome of our decisions (political or civil independence). Independence of 
mind comes in two parts. First, there is the basic capacity for rational thought and self-
reflection. Additionally, independent individuals must understand themselves as being both 
capable of and permitted to think in this way. Both parts are necessary but they should not be 
conflated. Oppressive social conditions might leave some people’s critical capacities intact 
while leaving them believing that their exercise is ‘not for the likes of them’. Political 
independence in turn entails not only having the requisite equal rights, ample resources and 
adequate opportunities, but also sufficient social standing. There must be a mutual 
recognition, or common knowledge, between citizens that they are each legitimate and equal 
co-members and creators of the shared social and political community.  
Wollstonecraft addresses both parts of independence in a holistic account. However, 
throughout the second Vindication, she makes clear that she considers the gravest threat to 
women’s freedom to be to their independence of mind in both aspects. Rights, for example, 
can do little to protect or empower those whose minds are vulnerable to being controlled by 
others. An important part of her solution comes from education.25 In addition to formal 
education a wider social education is required through having the right role models and 
sources of inspiration and challenge in our lives so that we can develop practical skills and 
our imaginations.26 Macaulay takes the concept of education much further. Every interaction 
we have with others, she argues, no matter how small or random, has an effect on the 
development of our personality and beliefs. “Every error thrown out in conversation”, she 
argues, “every sentiment which does not correspond with the true principles of virtue, is 
received by the mind, and like a drop of venomous poison will corrupt the mass with which it 
mingles” (1790, 103). This points to a highly insidious threat to women’s independence of 
mind, one that comes from the entire structure of background social beliefs, attitudes, 
practices, habits and values. In a patriarchal society, Wollstonecraft argues, all of these 
combine to thwart the progress not only of women’s intellectual freedom but of men’s too 
since both sexes inhabit the same set of restricted ideas.27 
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That people’s social background is both inescapable and profoundly shapes their 
beliefs, character and self-image so deeply need not mean that they cannot still be 
independent. There are always power structures around us that will coerce and influence us, 
whether these are laws or simply the wills of other people. The republican response to threats 
to freedom is not to avoid them or to defeat them. Instead it is to render them non-arbitrary. If 
other people’s wills represent a threat to our own, for example, then the republican solution is 
to place everyone under a law that restrains all of our behavior. So it is with the social and 
cultural threat to freedom. Wollstonecraft analyses the problem of a dominating culture using 
the same basic republican structure. People’s inability to reason for themselves, and their 
subsequent tendency to take ideas on trust or to be influenced by what they read or hear, 
“makes them all their lives, the slaves of prejudices” (2014, 139).28 She means slaves in a 
literal and formally republican sense of being subject to arbitrary power. That power is in this 
case cultural. Men enjoy a systematic power advantage – often referred to today as ‘male 
privilege’ – over women in virtue of the cultural and conceptual ideas that make up their 
shared social background. There is, of course, a significant difference between cultural and 
other sorts of power. Most forms of power – such as economic, political or physical power – 
can be regulated and constrained under appropriate non-arbitrary laws. In the case of a 
society’s cultural background, by contrast, the direction of influence seems to be the other 
way around. It is culture that influences how we understand what the law means (Coffee, 
2015). And while the law is a codifiable body of regulations, culture is open-ended, diffuse 
and constantly changing.  
There is, however, another defining characteristic of non-arbitrariness that the law and 
the cultural background do share. A non-arbitrary law must be inclusive and representative of 
the interests and perspectives of all those it governs (on pain of otherwise being non-
arbitrary). Since the law is the creation of the people for the protection of their freedom, it 
must be open to being made, challenged and refined or revised by each citizen. This is 
something that we can strive to replicate with cultural norms and ideas. We can open up the 
channels by which ideas and practices are spread so that women’s voices and interests can be 
heard and gain a foothold. This is an enormous undertaking, of course. What is required is, in 
effect, what Wollstonecraft describes as a “revolution in female manners” (2014, 71, 210, 
224). What she has in mind is not feminine behavior and etiquette so much as a radical 
remaking of the structure of economic, political and social relations in which women interact 
with each other and with men. What is needed is for women to take part in redefining the role 
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of both sexes. The result will be a collaborative remaking of the social background. This is 
clearly a long term project that Wollstonecraft concedes herself will take generations. But it 
gives us a blueprint. Creating cultural change, of course, is neither easy nor quick. 
Wollstonecraft concedes that “it will require a considerable length of time to eradicate the 
firmly rooted prejudices which sensualists have implanted” (2014, 73). Nevertheless, she 
remains optimistic. It may take time to overcome “the inertia of reason; but, when it is once 
in motion, fables, once held sacred, may be ridiculed” and the whole edifice can be replaced 
(2009, 56). 
If changing a culture and its social structures is the way to bring independence, the 
question remains as to what we are to say about women who are locked into existing sexist 
ways of life. Even taking account of the restriction in my focus here to considering 
independence as a political rather than metaphysical ideal or as an account of moral agency, I 
do not believe that the issues of denigration and paternalism arise in quite the same way as 
they do in the field of relational autonomy where they represent a prominent concern 
(Mackenzie 2016, 69). This stems from the bi-directional nature of independence as an 
account of the individual and the collective viewed in light of the institutional and cultural 
structures that organize and regulate their interactions. We cannot single out women in a 
patriarchal or sexist society as having their independence or agency diminished. In a 
corrupted society no one emerges unscathed. Men may be in the dominant position, but they 
are no less dependent on a background that impairs their ability to reflect and think critically. 
Even “men of the greatest abilities”, Wollstonecraft argues “have seldom had sufficient 
strength to rise above the surrounding atmosphere” (2014, 68). The reason is twofold. First, 
their thinking is constrained by the same distorted and false ideas as women’s and secondly, 
people in a dominant position come to have a particularly warped sense of reality as the 
information they receive is filtered to reinforce their sense of superiority. And so, just as “the 
page of genius [i.e. Rousseau] has always been blurred by the prejudices of the age”, she 
concludes, “some allowance should be made for a sex, who like kings, always see things 
through a false medium”.  
In arguing that both men and women are equally affected, I in no way mean to 
diminish the psychological and social harms that are done to oppressed and marginalized 
women. An internalized sense of inferiority or inadequacy can be crippling and the 
accompanying dangers of abuse, neglect and poverty cannot be overstated. My point is only 
that the subordinate party is never to be denigrated since dependent relationships always 
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affect both parties – dominator and dominated – as well as the society that permits them. That 
some women are more onerously burdened remains a collective problem to resolve and the 
relevant resources must be made available to enable those who are dominated to come to be 
independent in as many respects as possible. 
Does this, finally, mean that the state can intervene in dependent people’s lives? We 
must remember, first, that every member of society – all citizens – has a duty to be 
sufficiently independent. Willful dependence, no less than oppressed dependence, affects us 
all through the same set of corrupting processes. Some forms of life – the oft-cited ‘happy 
slave’, the stereotypically submissive, traditional wife to use Oshana’s examples – will be 
incompatible with maintaining a free society (2006, 84). This is the flip side of the relational 
nature of independence which while it liberates also constrains, albeit non-arbitrarily. We 
affect others through our relationships just as they affect us and so we all have an obligation 
to behave in non-damaging ways. Some life choices will be ruled out. A young woman, for 
example, who marries without completing her education and then lives a subservient and 
highly sheltered life, uncritically reflecting the opinions of others around her, would not be 
independent. On the republican account, if such a way of life were replicated on a large scale 
throughout society, this would have a corrupting effect on virtue that would be harmful to the 
free character of the state.  
This does not, however, open the door to state paternalism. Any intrusive action 
would not be for the good of the women concerned, as if government knows best. 
Intervention can only be justified if it is non-arbitrary which means it must be for the 
acknowledged common good where this is the outcome of a negotiation in which the affected 
women have a voice. Of course, in cases of subservience the targets of any action might not 
want a voice or be equipped to exercise it. In this case, the state may act only as far as is 
necessary to prevent the corruption of virtue so that as far as possible the relevant women’s 
lives are respected consistently with the conditions of basic independence. The result should 
be that a wide range of life-options are possible and in many cases, such as with women who 
choose to raise children without also engaging in paid labor, the rest of society must 
recognize its value and provide the necessary support to make it possible consistently with 
independence.  
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IV 
Although I should very much have liked to locate independence as a relational ideal within 
the wide range of alternative accounts of autonomy on this issue, the restrictions of space 
mean that such a dialogue must wait. Instead, I have demonstrated that independence, 
especially as Wollstonecraft understood it, is a distinctive relational ideal that is both 
substantial in its own right and that can engage with wider discourses on social and structural 
forms of oppression. I have done this by articulating three characteristic features derived from 
the republican understanding of the causal relationship between personal and collective 
freedom. The resulting conception addresses several concerns that motivate relational 
autonomy theorists, including the way that it retains a commitment to the normative value of 
individual persons while remaining responsive to the fact of human vulnerability and 
acknowledging the complex ways in which people are socially, historically, and culturally 
embedded (Mackenzie, 2014, 21-2). Seen in this light, I hope the door is now open for a 
fruitful engagement by republicans and Wollstonecraftians in this wider literature. 
                                                     
1 Wollstonecraft is growing in importance as a republican (See the articles by Bergès, Coffee, 
Halldenius, James, and Pettit in Bergès and Coffee 2016, also Halldenius 2015). Outside of a 
relatively small literature, however, Wollstonecraft’s presence in republican discourse is 
dwarfed by the standard canon of male historical sources and references to her are scanty. 
2 See the editors’ introduction to Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) and several of the chapters 
included. Also Mackenzie 2016. 
3 Marina Oshana (2006) briefly compares Pettit’s model of freedom as non-domination with 
her own conception of autonomy, for example, concluding that while it is necessary non-
domination is narrower and therefore insufficient for autonomy, p. 153-4.  
4 See for example Laborde (2008) as well as the scholars listed in footnote 1 above.  
5 There are of course important overlaps. Wollstonecraft for example is likely to have had 
some familiarity with Kant’s work. Like Kant, she also drew extensively on Rousseau’s work 
and shows some echoes of Kantian ideas in her own work (Bergès 2011, 78; Halldenius 
2007, 79) 
6 This comes with a heavy caveat. Pettit makes an explicit and elaborate connection between 
his political, moral and agency-related work (2007). Historically, Wollstonecraft was clearly 
concerned with these matters and Macaulay’s work on moral agency and the metaphysics of 
the self is extensive (Macaulay 1783).  
7 This use derived from the classifications in Roman Law. See, for example, Gaius (Book I, § 
48), “Another division in the law of Persons classifies men as either dependent [alieni iuris] 
or independent [sui iuris]” (1904, p. 75). See also Wirszubski 1968, p. 1. The convention of 
using independence and sui iuris interchangeably is found frequently throughout the history 
of republican writing. 
8 I use freedom as non-domination interchangeably with independence here although my 
preference is almost always to use the historical term independence unless it is confusing not 
to do so. As I reconstruct Wollstonecraft’s idea of independence there are several differences 
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between her use and Pettit’s contemporary notion of freedom as non-domination (Coffee 
2016, 2017). 
9 I do not develop this comparison with Nedelsky further since my aim in this section is only 
to clear up some misconceptions about the nature of independence itself. 
10 “A wife” Wollstonecraft describes, is “as much a man’s property as his horse, or his ass, 
she has nothing which she can call her own… and the laws of her country – if women have a 
country – afford her no protection or redress” (2005, 80-1).  
11 Wollstonecraft discusses the need for equality and reciprocity in marriage in both 
Vindications. “Affection in the marriage state” for example “can only be founded on respect” 
(1995, 22). See also 2014 (55-9). 
12 See Frederick Douglass’s story of Aunt Katy (2003, 135-143). 
13 This is a central premise of Wollstonecraft’s novel Mary: A Fiction (2008).  
14 I set out my understanding of republican freedom more fully in Coffee 2013 and 2014.   
15 The tripartite analysis is neither unique to me nor to Wollstonecraft. Lena Halldenius 
(2007) uses the same terms as applied to Wollstonecraft although her analysis differs from 
mine. She also refers to independence as a relational ideal although she does not analyse this 
term in detail (2015, 28-9). Although I discuss the tripartite structure in Wollstonecraft’s 
work, we also find it in many other writers of the period including Catharine Macaulay and 
Richard Price (Coffee 2017, 2013).  
16 Virtue is a complex and constantly changing concept. Although it may often have 
moralised and utopian or other-worldly connotations, all that is formally necessary for virtue 
is that a person behaves in ways that maintain the integrity and stability of the free republic. 
On my own account all that is necessary is that people make use of public reason in their 
deliberations and respect the outcome but I accept that richer notions are possible. See Coffee 
2016 (in the context of Wollstonecraft) and 2017 (in the context of Macaulay).  
17 “The rust of barbarity covers their proud masters and ruins them together. The poisoned 
breath of despotism destroys virtue in the bud” (in Bergès 2015, 111).   
18 This is a point Wollstonecraft reinforces in her introduction to her Vindication, arguing that 
her “main argument” for the rights of women is that a dependent woman “will stop the 
progress of knowledge, for truth must be common to all, or it will be inefficacious with 
respect to its influence on general practice” (2014, 22). 
19 http://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/pension-facts/pension-facts-tables/table-1-
demographics (accessed 31 July, 2017); https://www.statista.com/statistics/457822/share-of-
old-age-population-in-the-total-us-population/ (accessed: 31 July, 2017) 
20 See Coffee (forthcoming) for a version of this argument developed by Frederick Douglass. 
21 See Coffee 2014 on maternity rights and Wollstonecraft. 
22 A great deal has been written on this subject. See Pateman (1990, 3-15) for a classic 
discussion and Hirschmann (2008, 1-28) for a more recent treatment. See also Coffee 2015, 
52-6.  
23 For a discussion of this problem in the context of Wollstonecraft see Bergès 2011. 
24 The more general question of republican circularity is beyond my scope but I accept that it 
remains an issue for republicans. 
25 In the very first paragraph of her introduction to the Vindication, Wollstonecraft identifies 
“the neglected education of my fellow creatures [as] the grand source of the[ir] misery”, 
adding that “women in particular, are rendered weak and wretched by a variety of concurring 
causes [that originate in] a false system of education” (2014, 29). 
26 “Men, in their youth, are prepared for professions, and marriage is not considered as the 
grand feature in their lives; whilst women, on the contrary, have no other scheme to sharpen 
their faculties” (2014, 87). 
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27 If woman “be not prepared by education to become the companion of man, she will stop 
the progress of knowledge, for truth must be common to all, or it will be inefficacious with 
respect to its influence on general practice” (2014, 22). 
28 Here she builds on the same argument made by Macaulay who concludes that it “proves 
man to be the slave of custom and of precept” (1790, 169). I discuss this in detail in Coffee 
2013.  
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